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an irrevocable submission to arbitration without procedural devices assuring
a fair hearing involves too great a limitation upon the fundamental right
of appeal to the courts for protection.23 The welcome liberal approach of
the courti in re-examining the bases of a hoary common law doctrine is,
however, more important than the minutiae of the new law of arbitration
which it opens up. These can be shaped by future legislative and judicial
action; for there is nothing in the opinion which precludes the legislature
from making a suitably devised statutory method of arbitration exclusive.
M. G.
CRImINAL CONTEMPT-NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION CONCERNING CLOSED
CASE--RIGHT TO JuRY TRLAL-[Missouri].-An information was filed
against relator, a publishing corporation, and petitioners, the editor and
cartoonist, because of the publication of two editorials and a cartoon
strongly criticizing a trial judge for suggesting a nolle prosequi and dis-
missing a criminal action. The judge, after a hearing, found all three
guilty of contempt, assessed a fine against relator, and imposed sentences
of imprisonment upon petitioners. The Supreme Court of Missouri in quash-
ing the judgments and granting release by habeas corpus, held: published
comment concerning a decided case is not punishable as a contempt of court,
even though it scandalizes the court and tends to bring it into disrepute.
The court, however, rejected a contention that jury trial in contempt pro-
ceedings is essential to procedural due process. State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub-
lishing Co. v. Coleman."
The court bases its holding that the action of a trial judge in dismissing
a case terminates his authority to deal summarily with the publisher of
comment concerning it upon the view that a more technical interpretation
of pendency would restrict permissible discussion so narrowly as to make
it of little practical value in informing the public and serving as a check on
judicial maladministration. 2 Technically, a dismissal does not operate to
conclude a case until the expiration of the term of court, since a dismissal
Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) 5377-5380, see. 1922. An excellent example in
point is Illustration 6, Restatement, Contracts (1932) see. 550, comment a:
"A, on entering the employment of B * * * deposits $65 with B and signs
a contract which provides that B can retain the whole or any part of the
deposit as liquidated damages for any breach by A of the rules of B, and
that C, the president of B, shall be the sole judge of whether the whole
or any part of the deposit is to be retained."
23. Sayre, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 611.
1. Decided with Ex parte Fitzpatrick v. Fitzsimmons and Ex parte
Coghlan v. Fitzsimmons. (Mo. 1941) St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 11,
1941, p. 6A:1.
2. Cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Craig v. Hecht (1923)
263 U. S. 255, 281: "I think * * * that there was no matter pending before
the Court in the sense that it must be to make this kind of contempt possible.
It is not enough that somebody may hereafter move to have something done.
There was nothing then awaiting decision when the petitioner's letter was
published."
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may be set aside during the term and the case be reinstated on the docket.3
The decision here is realistic and sound, however.
In arriving at its decision, the supreme court re-examines the basis of
the summary power to punish indirect contempts, i. e. those not committed
in the presence of the court, and restricts the previous rule of State ex inf.
Crow v. Shepherd,4 asserting the existence of the power, to pending cases.
The Shepherd case held (1) that the contempt power arises out of the
inherent necessity for courts to be able to maintain order and protect them-
selves against interference with the impartial administration of justice; (2)
that it is rooted in the common law by immemorial usage; and (3) that it
may be invoked for the protection of the court whenever any publication
tends to scandalize it, whether or not the publication refers to a pending
case.5 In the instant case, however, the court finds that the power to punish
for contempt not connected with pending litigation is not based on "im-
memorial usage." Rather it cites recent researches 6 to show that "scandaliz-
ing the court" became punishable as a contempt by summary process only
because of the weight accorded to certain wholly unfounded assumptions of
Wilmot 7 and Blackstone,* subsequently adopted by such authorities as
Hardwicke,9 Kent,10 and others. Thus the summary power to punish con-
tempts relating to closed cases did not exist in fact at common law." The
basis for the contempt power is to protect the court from external inter-
ference with its judicial functions. Since, however, such interference can
operate only during the pendency of a case, no publication, no matter how
scandalous, concerning a case which has been decided, need be summarily
3. State v. Lonon (1932) 331 Mo. 591, 56 S. W. (2d) 378.
4. (1903) 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79, 99 Am. St. Rep. 624.
5. The court specifically refrained from attaching importance to the
purely technical pendency which it recognized as present. The case involved
contempt of the supreme court itself. A motion for rehearing was still
possible in the proceeding that was criticized. The case held R. S. Mo.
(1889) sec. 1616 unconstitutional insofar as it might purport to limit in
any way the judicial power to punish for contempt, on the ground that it
constituted legislative interference with the judicial prerogative and hence
violated the separation of powers. The act was interpreted, however, as
not really restrictive upon the courts. Though later modified by Ex parte
Creasy (1912) 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W. 914, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478, to
permit reasonable limitation by statute of the punishment which courts
might impose for contempt, the decision was part of a trend which has
resulted in the subversion by judicial construction of statutes which were
generally recognized and accepted throughout most of the nineteenth cen-
tury as intended to protect basic American rights. (See Frankfurter and
Landis, infra note 6, at 1029 et seq.; Nelles and King, infra note 6, at 536
et seq.)
6. Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (1927); Frankfurter and
Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010;
Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States (1928) 28
Col. L. Rev. 401 and 525; Thomas, Problems of Contempt Court (1934).
7. See Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 6, at 1046, footnote 128,
citing Wilmot, Notes and Opinions of Judgments (1802) 243, 254.
8. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, c. 20, sec. III.
9. Roach v. Garvan (Chan. 1742) 2 Atk. 469, 471, 26 Eng. Rep. 683, 684.
10. 1 Kent, Commentaries (12th ed. 1873) note p. 300.
11. Fox, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 116-117.
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dealt with. The court thus manifests a desire to limit the possibility of
judicial encroachment on the rights of freedom of speech and of the press.
It reflects a salutary reaction from the recent tendency toward undue
expansion of the contempt power.= The present case brings Missouri law
approximately into line with that of a majority of the states and of the
federal courts. 3
Despite the liberalizing effect of this decision, the reasoning of the court
may be criticized as disingenuous. The court avails itself of researches in
legal history to confine to pending cases the summary power over contempt
by publication, but ignores the point that the central fact developed by these
same researches is that the courts had no power at common law to punish
any indirect contempt, whether relating to a past or to a pending case,
except after a jury trial.14 The Missouri court, refuting defendants' claim
of a right to jury trial, properly states that the guarantee in the Missouri
Constitution of 1820 refers to that right as it existed at common law prior
to 1820, and then says further that contempts have always been punished
summarily at common law. This is true as to direct contempts, those com-
mitted in the presence of the court, but the whole point of the authorities
-which the court itself cites is that it was never true of indirect contempts
until the courts usurped such power in the seventeenth century.0
Again, in reasserting the inherent and necessary power of judicial
tribunals to safeguard the administration of justice from interference, the
court fails to recognize that contempt by publication, or other conduct out-
side the presence of the court which interferes with a pending case, has
traditionally been dealt with through criminal process.1O Here the court
assumes that any scandalous publication referring to a pending case will
be obstructive, denying that there is any valid distinction between con-
tempts committed in the presence of the court and indirect contempts by
publication. This fails to discriminate between conduct which is obstructive
and comment which may be merely defamatory. Contempt means something
more than adverse criticism or disrespect. Published matter is not often
obstructive in any real sense, even of pending litigation.
R. K.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-POWER OF FEDERAL COURTs TO PUNISH SUMMARILY
-GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION-TOLEDO NEWSPAPER Co. V. UNITED STATES
OVERRULED--[United States] .- Defendant was convicted of criminal con-
tempt in a federal district court for attempting to bribe the plaintiff in g
wrongful death action to dismiss it. The attempt took place more than 100
miles from the courthouse. Held: reversed. Section 268 of the Judicial
12. See supra note 5.
13. 17 C. J. S., Contempt (1939) 41, sec. 30; Note (1935) 24 Cal. L. Rev.
114; Nye v. U. S. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 810.
14. See Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 6, at 1042; see also Fox,
op. cit. supra note 6, at pp. 116-117.
15. Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 6, at 1045.
16. See Nye v. U. S., supra note 13. See Comment (1941) 26 WASHING-
TON U. LAW QUARTERLY 566.
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